In attempting to answer this question, a number of issues
and related questions spring to mind. Firstly the definition of peace
operations – does this include peace keeping, peace building and peace
enforcement?

In attempting to outline reasonably objectives measures used
to judge the success (or failure) of a peace operation, one must first ask what
are the expectations of a successful peace operation? Should these expectations
be evaluated within, or ignoring the context of variables that are often quite
of control of a peace operation – the complexity he mission, the point of
intervention and so on.

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While criteria or measurements to judge more finely the
relative success of peace operations may be difficult to determine,
particularly across different missions, many would argue that the presence of a
neutral peace operation force on the ground within a conflict, at a very
minimum will bring a measure of security to the local civilian population and
is bound to have some impact on reducing civilian injury and death. It seems
intuitively to be the case –  but can
this assumption be made in relation to a minimum positive impact of peace
operations. For instance, if much of an environment is out of control of the
mission, how can this really be assessed. Also if there is a minimum of short
term benefit how this stand up over the long term? Also, can it be argued that
at times, possible negative impact of even supposedly neutral forces added into
a volatile situation on the ground at times outweigh whatever minimum benefit a
peace operations bring to a situation. It is clear that in attempting to answer
these questions, assumptions regarding even a minimum of benefit a peace
operation may bring cannot be made, and that rigorous criteria need to be
applied to evaluate even the most minimum level of impact – positive or
negative.

While there was much evaluation regarding the implementation
of peace operations, for quite a long period not a lot of attention was given
to development of a methodology for measuring their success. As ? Diehl, one of
the earliest to attempt to do so, has pointed along with Druckman

               “An
abundance of attention has been given to the inputs (or independent variables)
in peace                operation studies,
and considerably less (if any at all) is given to the outcomes (or dependent                variables);” (2010)

Diehl’s first attempt to provide a set of measurements for
evaluating the success of peace operations involved defining two main criteria
– whether they succeed in limiting an armed conflict and whether they
contribute to the resolution of the conflict. (1993). Having applied these
criteria to a range of conflicts including … Diehl concluded that missions
were successful when they met the following conditions: the conflict was
intra-state, the peace-keeping were neutral, there at the invitation of the
host country, were lightly armed for self- defence only, neutral and the
geography of the conflict enabled the mission to operate with reasonable lack
of invulnerability and which facilitated separation of combatants and detection
of violations of agreed peace??.

The conditions, particuraly the last ones referenced, which
have to pertain to enable success with the criteria used, arguably invalidate
the criteria and indeed point to a degree of wasted effort in using them to
analyze missions except to validate the obvious – that the optimum conditions
provide the optimum chance of success.

In his analysis of Diehl’s initial criteria, Johansen criticizes
the fact that Diehl uses an ideal state of peace against which to judge the
success of a mission. (1994) The criteria don’t take into account the
particular context of a mission or the relative success that a mission have in
contrast to what might have occurred if no peace operation had been introduced.
Johansen also considers the second criteria to be one which peace keepers have
no influence or control and therefore should not be used at all.

Johansen also criticizes the fact the Diehl doesn’t
distinguish between  violent events that
peace mission has no control over and ones that they do. He points therefore
that these issues can lead to very different judgements for peace missions that
could otherwise be considered relatively successful.  For example, UNEF1 operation which was pulled
at the request of the Egyptians just prior the ’67 war, would be judged a
failure because of ensuing war with Israel despite a previous decade or more of
peace, while UNEF2 would be judged a success because of the Camp David
agreement between Egypt and Israel although Johansen would argue that
peacekeepers would have little or no influence or control over these events.

(ME need to check does Diehl actually judge UNEF1 etc)

Johansen argues instead that the effectiveness of peace
operations should be judged by analysing their impact on local population , and
by contrasting the situation with what would have occurred if the peace
operation had not happened.

               “We
should try to judge whether peacekeeping operations reduce the likelihood of
violence                even by a modest
degree, discourage incidents from escalating, make violence less bloody                when it does occur, or postpone
“the inevitable” recurrence of conflict long enough to give                diplomacy a further opportunity
to succeed.”

 

ME – either delete point
below or clarify and bring into reast

Johansen also states that
instead of using an ideal or “unexamined standard,  peace operations should be “compared to
traditional security policies” which will enable  to extract a international code of conduct by
an increasingly “authoratitive PO agency”

 

ME – what does “traditional
security policies” mean?? ie seems comparing “life with them against
life without them”

also in contrast to Diehl
assertion that PO can never be enforcing, J points to Somalia and Yugoslavia  as evidence of blend of trad. po and new
types of UN enforcement  as  new means of PO

Johansen’s proposal to evaluate peace missions by
contrasting the situation with what might have been without their presence is
somewhat problematic. If this was done using a “before and after”
approach, efforts to evaluate the impact based on what was happening before the
forces arrived and what after would require a very situation in which much of
the conflict topography was similar, which may be unlikely given the volatile
nature of conflict situations. Referring to some  hypothetical scenario is open to the same
criticism  launched by Johansen of
Diehl’s “ideal state of peace” yardstick.

While initially peace operations were considered to be restricted
to peacekeeping rather than peace building, they certainly have evolved and
Johansen’s criticism that Diehl’s second criteria is not relevant doesn’t stand
up at this point anyway. Johansen also seems to be invaliding this criticism
when he points to the evolvement of peace operations as far as not only peace
building but peace enforcement as in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Arguably
and even more because of the way peace operations have evolved, it can be
considered reasonable to evaluate the impact a peace mission has on reducing or
eliminating conflict within a region. Common sense has to dictate – for
instance in the Congo, the UN was considered to be completely ineffective
outside of the capital city. They didn’t have the manpower or resources to
cover any substantial area. But how then should such as  mission be evaluated? Should the mission be
considered a success because UN troops could reduce violence in an urban area
where they had a reasonable presence? If so it would seem that Johansen would
fall into the same (truism??) OR should the UN mission be considered in light
of the entire conflict. It seems that both answers are correct in order to
provide a fuller analysis of a mission. Restricting one’s gaze to the area of
dimension of the conflict solely under the control of the UN does provide some
analysis on how successfully peace forces are operating within those limits. However,  to get a proper analysis of the impact they
are having, there also is a need to widen the view to the entire conflict and
indeed to analyse the conflict vertically at different dimensions also (me
clarify this)

ME check UN in congo

In addition to Diehl, others such as Bratt and Browne
attempted in the mid to late 90’s to provide a methodology and criteria for
analysis of peace missions. Bratt (1996) outlined these four criteria for
mission success: completion of the mandate, conflict resolution facilitation,
conflict containment and reduction of casualties across the board. Bratt
considered a mission successful if it facilitate conflict resolution, and
moderately successful if any of the other three criteria were fulfilled.  Likewise Browne ( 1993?) referenced the fulfilment
of the mandate as a criteria for the success of UN mission as well as
resolution of the conflict,  and contribution
to international peace by elimination or reduction of the conflict. (ME check
no plagiarism here – check Browne and reword

https://archive.org/stream/97-454-crs/97-454_djvu.txt

(me above article suggests many analysts state this these
criteria and text goes on to analyse the criteria might be more accurate to
state that in report these criteria are referenced (or to leave her out??_

 

Later analyses include that of Darya Pushkina (2006) who
emphases the priority of reduction of human suffering as a measure of the
success of a peace operation. In her article “A recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping MIssion”,
her primary focus is to analyse why some UN peace missions are more successful
than others, but this necessitated defining a set of criteria with which to
judge the success of a mission. These criteria include the primary ones of
reducing conflict and human suffering in the area, preventing the conflict form
spreading and contribution to its resolution. On that basis, Pushkina defined
missions such as UNTAG as successful, mission including UNTAC as partially
successful and missions including UNPROFOR as unsuccessful.

ME – put footnote here

Me – include the mission groups and why there were
successful?? maybe at least the successful – do we need to say why – include
footnote of acronyms

 

Pushkina makes some important observations on previous
analyses of measurements for successful peace missions. She raises an important
point in relation to those such as Bratt and Brown who would prioritize using
the mandate of a mission. She argues that a mandate may be very specific to a
mission,  but that missions may share
primary goals which allow for evaluation and comparison of multiple missions
using similar criteria. While one could argue that fulfilment of a mandate
regardless of what that mandate might be, is a criterion which can be applied
to multiple missions, it would be seem to be helpful to have a similar
specified goal to evaluate across missions. For example, specific mandates might
be as disparate as supervising elections or monitoring a ceasefire and it’s
easier to evaluate multiple missions in how they succeed in relation to a
particular common goal.

While an evaluation may be created to  include goals common to mission as well as
mandates specific to a mission, the methodology also needs to take into account
the relative context that mission is
taking place in.  For example, violence
containment are similar goals for the missions in . .. and but surely the
difficulties inherent in achieving that goal are much higher in the first case.
Violence containment in one context may be much more difficult to attain than
in another. Therefore it seems essential to have some kind of baseline
evaluation of the mission topography to which the criteria are being applied.

There is also the issue with who’s applying the evaluation.
Stakeholders and vested interests may use evaluations to provide results that
are in their results.

Another issue is the sad but realistic possibility that a
peace operation may not impact positively or that the positive impact is
outweighed by negative impacts.  A
framework that aims to provide an accurate evaluation must take account of  negative variables such as hostility between
peace operatives and locals or violence inflicted by peace operatives on locals
(Guardian, 2015)  or potential paralysis
in the long term of  resolution of
difficulties in countries with a  long
term presence of operatives who’s primary focus is peacekeeping rather than
conflict resolution.

In later works, Diehl this time with Druckman (2010) returns
to the issue of a methodology of evaluating peace operations proposing a more
nuanced and multi-dimensional approach at different point along a mission’s
timeline. Diehl and Druckman argue that specifying primary goals for missions
enables criteria to be applied and evaluated across missions. They identify the
following goals that are common to many mission 
–  “violence abatement,
conflict containment and conflict settlement” ( ). In addition to general
goals, they include mission-specific criteria for evaluating a mission. Variables
are not stand alone static references but are positioned in a relational aspect
to one another to reflect a process. They use the following flowchart to
indicate how the general goals interact with mission-specific ones (2010).

 /

 Annie
Leibovitz’s photographic work Robert La Fosse, New York City
1990 (Leibovitz 1992, fig. 6) captures
the essence of the dancer’s pain………

Note: Include
the author/artist and title of the work in the body of the text and put an
in-text reference for the book that the image/illustration is in.

 

In addition to a relational approach to variables, Diehl and
Druckman acknowledge that variables may differ 
or may be evaluated differently depending on the ..at different levels.
So employ a multidimensional approach that 
takes distinctive account of  components
each of the following: the different stakeholders involved (local and
international), varying timelines, specific baselines, the core and specific goals
of the mission.

When criteria to judge the success of a peace operation, a
complicating factor is the nature of success – 
as Diehl and Druckman  point out
“success for whom?” They point to the fact there can be multiple
stakeholders, interests and agenda for a peace operation. For example, the
supposed driver foe the peace operation in Cambodia was the establishment of
democracy but there was also a vested interest in re-integrating the country in
the region (whose interest – me)

me – get reference and what do Druckman and Diehl say about
dealing with this??

Diehl and Druckman’s multidimensional methodology seems to
address many of the weaknesses of Diehl’s earlier criteria. It allows for the
success of general goals to be evaluated while also grounding the criteria in
the specifics of a mission. Diehl and Druckman continue to assert, against the rlier
criticism of Johansen (1994), that the evaluation should not restricted to
areas directly under the control of peace operatives. They contend that only
analysing those outcomes under the control of the peace operation
“presumes an a priori confirmation of effects of those particular
operations”. As stated earlier, the restriction proposed by Johanson
provides an unrealistic and skewered appraisal of the overall effect of a
mission on an conflict.

 

The collection .. contain a report by Diehl and Druckman of
the results of applying he methodology to .

.It also contains reports of analyses by others of applying
the methodology to other peace operations and their proposals for refining the
methodology.

John Braithwaite(200 applies the model to the East Timor
peace mission highlighting in his introduction, the weakness of the model
identified by Diehl and Druckman themselves. This weakness involves giving a
temporal and separate sequence and equal weighting to the processes of conflict
containment, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Braithwaite also highlights an
issue that has been raised here already, regarding the involvement of others in
the processes. As Braithwaite points out “most peacebuilding is not done
by peace operatives. However, as he points out, the model is easily adapted to
evaluating the facilation of peace making that may be done by others (me is
this even worth putting in or put somewhere else as a brief comment??

The inclusion of both common goals and specific mandates in
the framework by Diehl and Druckman allows for comparative quantative analysis
across missions while also taking into account the specifics of a mission.
Their multidimensional approach enables the complexities of a mission and its
variance over time to be reflected in the framework.  As Braithwaite points out, it can be used in
a flexible manner.. .

While it may be considered “another day’s work” to
evaluate why successes and failures occur in a mission, a framework that is
truly reflective of the implementation and its context, should ideally
facilitate access to this information. For example Braithwaite(2013) discusses
the issues with the police force in East Timor and how it contributed to the
breakdown of peace in 2006. HIs summary application of the Diehl and Druckman
framework points to this failure but doesn’t provide a clear reason for
it.  As Braithwaite points out, the
framework can be very useful in providing a short summary evaluation of a
mission and more extensive work has actually been done using the framework as a
basis.

 

 Thakur Ramesh, in
referencing the work of Diehl and Druckman, in a disscussion on tasserts
that 

” It is relatively straightforward to point to success
and failure on the various dimensions of performance appraisal provided by the
Diehl-Druckman framework. It is far more challenging to try and provide sound
and intersubjectively transmissible explanations for the successes and
failures” (2012)

He references the work of Lise Morjé Howard who, for Thakur,
provides a good complement in this respect to Diehl and Druckman by addressing
this issue in the context of UN missions in civil conflicts. Howard examines a
set of successful and unsuccessful missions by querying why success or failure
occurred, what the learning outcomes were for the UN1.
Interestingly Howard in her study, concludes that success, while difficult to
achieve happens more than is generally perceived: it depends according to her
on these conditions: agreement from local factions to UN presence, supportive
but not dominating engagement by the UNSC, and first tier detailed operational
knowledge by peace operatives on the ground.

Even when querying the source of failures and successes, and
while including criteria that acknowledge the possible negative impact of a
mission, the frameworks referenced, all start from a positive perspective, and
with the assumption that the peace operation is fundamentally a good idea.

In his review of the book, Peace Operations Success: A
Comparative Analysis by Diehl and Druckman (2013), and Why Peace Processes Fail, by Jasmine-Kim Westendorf (2015), Thierry
Tardy contrasts the more “optimistic” approach taken by Diehl and
Druckman with that of Westendorf.  Westendorf
criticises approaches that she feels either take a minimalist view, emphasising
physical security or a “maximalist” approach that is focused on the
basis of conflict in general. She wants instead to take what she calls a
“minimalist+politics” approach. As Tardy points out, Westendorf
claims that the failure of main peace missions lies in their lack of acknowledgement
of conflict as political in nature. Rather than 
a series of separate events, she sees peace building as a process on a
continuum from a state of war. Starting from an end point of what a process  of peace aims for, “to establish stable
social political and security conditions in which political conflicts are no
longer settled by means of violence” and uses the three equivalent
parameters of justice and governance creation along with transitional justice
to evaluate the process along that continuum. In the case study that she
examines she finds that where peace missions have engaged in a meaningful way
with the local political and social context, that the mission has proved more
successful.2

Gezim Visoka takes the issue further by moving from a positive
realm to one where the intentionality of the mission and its stakeholders are interrogated.
  He
posits an alternative framework based on figurative sociology, which  first advanced  provides a framework of intentionality,
preformativity and very importantly, consequences as in the framework outlined
below.

This enables hidden intentions behind declared intentions to
be exposed (me how) and also provides an analysis of how implementation of a
seemingly good intention can lead to negative consequences. For example, Visoka
refers to goal of implementing law and order in Bosnia which was then
appropriated by ethnic factions to

 

The different frameworks and methodologies provide different
strengths. For instance the more recent framework proposed by Diehl and Druckman
can be used to provide a summary analysis to monitor an ongoing peace operation
or can be applied in greater detail with added indicators and dimensions to provide
an extensive analysis at different points during and after an operation, and is
therefore a valuable and flexible toolset. However it is a toolset that assumes
the fundamental worth of the operation its monitoring and doesn’t provide direct
information on the reasons for success or failure. Also, while nuanced, it still
doesn’t highlight the consequences of actions driven by different intentionalities..
It Others such as Westendorf and Visoka provide alternative frameworks that can
interrogate more fully the interaction of the peace operation and host community,
which enables the frameworks and their resulting analyses to reflect and belong
more fully to those communities as well to those who would wish to support them
towards  peace.

1
Howard’s examination includes the UN missions considered successful in Namiba,
El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozamibique, E. Slavonia and East Timor as well those
deemed a failure in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia.

2
Westendorf examines these case-studies: Cambodia(1991), Mozambique (1992),
Bougainville(2001), Liberia(2003), North and South Sudan(2005) and Aceh(2005)

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